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Tax Frauds and the Government's
Right of Access to Taxpayer's
Books and Records
RONALD K. VAN WERT*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Tax Frauds: Go
Collect $200
Directly to Jail, Do Not Pass Go, Do Not
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes considered payment of taxes
to be an important duty of a citizen because "with them I buy
civilization."' His attempt to purchase civilization was carried
through even at his death when he bequeathed his estate to the
United States.2
However, this great jurist's attitude is shared by very few
taxpayers. Further, the self-enforcement program of the tax
laws, as well as the complexity of the tax system itself, creates
an annual temptation to each taxpayer to evade the payment of
tax.
* B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 1965; J.D., Hastings
College of Law, 1968; LL.M. (Taxation), George Washington University, 1970.
Private Practice, 1970-present; Certified Specialist, Taxation, California Board
of Legal Specialization; Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine Uni-
versity School of Law.
1. R. PAUL, TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY 277 (1947).
2. CROWLEY & MANNING, CRIMINAL TAX FRAUD-REPRESENTING THE TAX-
PAYER BEFORE TRIAL 11 n.6 (1976).
Because the Federal tax system requires self-enforcement
and the chances for evasion or avoidance are so great, Congress
has given the Internal Revenue Service extremely broad collec-
tion rights and procedures which appear to conflict with the
constitutional and statutory rights of the taxpayer. When the
Internal Revenue Service uncovers potential tax evasion, it uses
all of its tools to obtain incriminating evidence and to prosecute
the taxpayer to the fullest extent of the law. Although the
chances of being caught for tax evasion appear to be slight
because of the millions of returns that are filed annually, the
taxpayer that is caught will probably be tried regardless of his
reputation in the community (or because of his reputation in the
community) and regardless of whether he has cooperated fully
with the taxing authorities (or because he has personally pro-
vided through cooperation the missing element of the crime).
The predicament of the uncovered tax evader is compounded
by the fact that the recognized constitutional and statutory, rules
which are part of the arsenal of the defense attorney do not
appear to be available to the attorney defending the tax evader.
For example, an attorney can be forced to divulge and turn over
books and records of his client even though the client has
brought them to him for safekeeping.3 Moreover, the attorney is
often surprised that his own statements, written or oral, may be
used to convict his client of tax evasion.
The tax evader also believes that the crime of tax evasion is a
minor crime and that conviction will result at most in a fine. The
division of the Department of Justice which reviews all tax
cases prior to indictment promulgates the policy that incarcera-
tion shall be either recommended in all tax fraud convictions, or
no recommendation of any kind will be made.4 Plea bargaining
will not include an agreement that the defendant will not serve
time. Until recently it was also the policy of the Department of
Justice, Tax Division, Criminal Section, to publicize fully any
indictment of any taxpayer because of the profound effect on
other taxpayers which resulted in their "voluntary" compliance.
This policy is still in force, but the extent of publicity is depen-
dent on the local U.S. Attorney where the case is tried. The
indictment itself and resulting publicity can economically be as
disastrous to the client as a conviction, since it can destroy the
ability of the client to obtain business or financing.
3. United States v. Dolkris, 408 F.2d 918 (6th Cir. 1969).
4. Statement of Cono R. Namorato, Chief, Tax Division, Dept. of Justice,
May 12-13, 1977, Practicing Law Institute, Lecture, Tax Frauds.
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B. What is a Tax Crime?
Sections 7201 through 7207 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 set forth the major tax crimes. Section 72011 is considered
the primary criminal tax fraud statute. It provides as follows:
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat
any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition
to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both, together with the costs of prosecu-
tion.
If the taxpayer does not want to report all of his income and
desires to avoid the fraud penalties under Section 7201, the
Code allows an "election" to the tax evader. The "best" course
of action for the evader (if he is to be caught) would be merely
not to file, since willful failure to file a return and pay a tax is a
misdemeanor under Section 7203. Though filing a false return
invokes the harsh sanctions of section 7201,6 failure to file is
easier to discover, especially if the taxpayer has filed previous
returns.
Prior to United States v. Bishop, taxpayers on trial argued
that Section 7203 was a lesser included offense of Section 7201
and must be included in any jury instruction as such when
Section 7201 was charged. The taxpayers reasoned that the
"willfulness" requirement in both Sections was qualitatively
different; i.e., if the "willfulness" was not extreme, the taxpayer
could be convicted of the misdemeanor only. The Supreme
Court in Bishop ruled that the test for willfulness is the same
for both Section 7201 and 7203.8 If willfulness is absent, the
court or jury may not find the taxpayer guilty under either
section. However, if willfulness is present, the offense may be
chargeable under either section.
Section 7202 is rarely used by the Internal Revenue Service in
its enforcement program because of its limited applicability to
the general public since it applies to the person who is "required
5. Unless otherwise stated, all Section references are to the Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, and relevant sections therein.
6. See Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
7. 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
8. Id. at 361. Although this opinion discussed § 7207 and § 7206(1), the rule
of law arising from this opinion applies to other Internal Revenue Code sections
as well, such as § 7201 and § 7203.
. .. to collect, account for, and pay over any tax imposed by
[Title 26] . . .who willfully fails to collect or truthfully account
for and pay over such tax." An increased use of the Section may
be seen because of the growing concern by the Internal Revenue
Service and other governmental agencies9 about cash payments
to employees by employers. Since the success of the self-en-
forcement tax system is based in large part on the knowledge of
the taxpayer that his or her income will be reported in some
form or another by a third party, control at the employer level is
vital to the Internal Revenue Service.
Under Section 7204, an employer who willfully fails to furnish
his employee with a W-2 in the correct manner and time, and
showing the information as required by Section 6051 (W-2 infor-
mation), or who willfully furnishes a false or fraudulent W-2, is
subject to imprisonment for not more than one year and a fine
of $1,000 for each offense.
Surprisingly, there is a specific criminal section for the em-
ployee who either willfully fails to provide his employer with
information or willfully provides false or fraudulent informa-
tion for purposes of determining the amount of withholding
from the employee's wages, salary or other compensation.' 0 For
example, where an employee states that he has four dependents
when he has only three dependents, he is subject to criminal
sanctions even if he reports all of his income and pays all of his
taxes.
A taxpayer who willfully makes and subscribes any return,
statement or other document, under penalty of perjury and
which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every
material part shall be subject to three years of imprisonment, a
$5,000 fine and the cost of prosecution." This section (7206) can
be used against a tax preparer or adviser if such person willful-
ly aids, assists, or otherwise counsels in the preparation or pre-
sentation of any return, or document which is fraudulent or is
false' 2 as to any material matter. 13 It is immaterial that the
person who is assisted or counseled by the preparer or assister
is unaware of the falsity of the return or document. There have
been such widespread unethical practices by preparers and ad-
9. There was a recent attempt in the California Legislature to prevent the
payment of cash for services rendered. All payments would have to be by check.
10. I.R.C. § 7205.
11. I.R.C. § 7206.
12. There is probably no difference between a false document or fraudulent
document since the section requires that the false or fraudulent matter be
material and that willfulness be present.
13. I.R.C. § 7206(2).
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visers that Congress has recently made numerous changes to
the Internal Revenue Code which provide additional civil penal-
ties for the preparer and expand the definition of preparer.1 4
Section 7206 includes specific language to prevent through
criminal sanctions any person from willfully concealing proper-
ty with respect to a tax from any officer or employee of the
United States or withholding, falsifying, or destroying records
in connection with compromises, or closing agreements. Furth-
er, a person will be subject to its sanctions if such person (direct-
ly or indirectly) willfully, and with intent to evade or defeat the
assessment or collection of any tax under Title 26, removes,
deposits, or conceals property "in respect whereof any tax is or
shall be imposed, or upon which levy is authorized by Section
6331. '" 1 Section 7207 provides that:
Any person who willfully delivers or discloses to the Secretary or his
delegate any list, return, account, statement, or other document,
known by him to be fraudulent or to be false as to any material matter,
shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than 1
year, or both. Any person required pursuant to sections 6047(b) or (c),
6056, or 6104(d) to furnish any information to the Secretary or any
other person who willfully furnishes to the Secretary or such other
person any information known by him to be fraudulent or to be false
as to any material matter shall be fined not more than $1,000, or
imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.
This section is another section which enables the Government
(or taxpayer's counsel) to plea bargain, since under Bishop the
willfulness in the misdemeanor statute is the same as in the
felony statutes.
Section 7210 of the Internal Revenue Code prescribes crimi-
nal sanctions for failing to obey a summons issued pursuant to
various sections of the Internal Revenue Code. There are
numerous other sections of the 1954 Code dealing with, among
others, attempts to interfere with the administration of Internal
Revenue Laws (Sections 7212 and 7215), unauthorized disclo-
sure of information (Section 7213), offenses by officers and em-
ployees of the United States in connection with any revenue law
of the United States (Section 7214) and disclosures or use of
information by preparers of returns (Section 7216).
In addition to the Sections of the Internal Revenue Code set-
14. Section 1203 of The Tax Reform Act of 1976. I.R.C. §§ 7701(a)(36), 6694,
7427, 6107, 6109(a)(4), 6060, 6695, 6696 and 7407.
15. I.R.C. § 7206(4).
ting forth criminal sanctions, various sections of Title 18, of the
United States Code, are often involved in criminal tax cases.
Included in the government's arsenal of weapons against the
tax evader are: Section 371, conspiracy (e.g., preparer and tax-
payer agreeing to evade tax); Section 1001, false statements to
governmental agencies, whether written or oral, sworn or un-
sworn (e.g., taxpayer lies to special agent of Internal Revenue
Service that he has reported all of his income); 6 and, Section
1341, mail frauds.
As can be seen by the brief explanation of the tax crimes,
they, along with Title 18 offenses, are sufficiently broad to en-
compass all tax evasion devices and schemes of the taxpayer. 17
In addition, the taxpayer is not the only target. In fact, the
taxpayer may not have committed any crime or the government
may not be able to prove a crime against the taxpayer, and yet
his accountants, attorneys, assistants, preparers, and associates
may be indicted and convicted, even though the entire tax bene-
fit of the scheme or device accrues to the taxpayer.' 8
It is not difficult for the taxpayer and his representative to
understand what constitutes tax evasion. Further, both can dis-
cover easily what tools the Government has at its disposal to
investigate and uncover tax evasion. What is difficult is deter-
mining the extent of the rights of the taxpayer or his representa-
tive in preventing the Government from obtaining information
and evidence from the taxpayer or third party that may be used
against the taxpayer either in a civil proceeding or criminal
proceeding. It is the purpose of this article to examine such
rights and to suggest arguments that may be asserted by the
taxpayer at each step of the investigation.
II. GOVERNMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS TO TAXPAYERS'
BOOKS AND RECORDS
The Government has at its disposal numerous methods of
16. See, United States v. Gripentrog, U.S. Tax Cas. § 9629 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
The court stated that "[ifn general, the courts have held the statute [Section 1001
of Title 18] inapplicable to negative or.exculpatory responses made by a defend-
ant in the course of a conference or interrogation not initiated by a defendant,
(citations); and applicable to positive statements which substantially impair
the basic functions entrusted by law to a governmental agency."
17. Regardless of whether criminal prosecution is sought, the taxpayer may
be liable for civil fraud penalties. Under § 6653(b), the taxpayer is assessed 50%
of the underpayment of taxes. The 50% is imposed against the entire under-
stated amount even if only part of the understatement is due to fraud. A convic-
tion or guilty plea under either § 7201 or § 7206 will be conclusive as to civil
fraud. Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1965).
18. Obviously, the accountant, etc. does receive compensation from the
taxpayer for services rendered. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1969); I.R.C. § 7206(2).
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obtaining the books and records of the taxpayer or third parties
whose books and records are relevant to the investigation of the
taxpayer. The method selected may require court review if a
search warrant is sought or may involve misrepresentation and
stealth, usually in cases where the taxpayer is either unaware of
his rights or unaware that the focus of an inquiry by the Govern-
ment has changed from civil to criminal. Obviously, the method
generally used by the Internal Revenue Service agent is to mere-
ly request from the taxpayer (or third party) the books and
records thought to be necessary. If the taxpayer is reticent, the
Secretary of the Treasury, (herein "the Secretary"), or his dele-
gate may serve on the taxpayer (or third party) a summons. 19 If
the taxpayer is under indictment or if a criminal investigation
has been concluded, a search warrant could be sought to compel
the production of records not voluntarily turned over. If the
Internal Revenue Service is unsuccessful, it may seek to use the
grand jury as its tool in obtaining incriminating evidence other-
wise not available.20 It has even been suggested by a senior
attorney for the Government that if all else fails, the Govern-
ment might, through its power of levy, enter the taxpayer's
house or office for the ostensible purpose of satisfying a tax
lien. Once inside incriminating "property" could then be seized
even though the Government could not obtain a search warrant;
there had been no grand jury investigation; and a criminal in-
vestigation had been concluded.
In order to fully protect the taxpayer, the attorney for the
taxpayer as well as the taxpayer's recordholders must under-
stand the constitutional and statutory rights of the taxpayer in
connection with the right of the Government to obtain and copy
the taxpayer's books and records. It must not be concluded that
objection is required only in those cases where criminality is
present. It is often as important to safeguard records, and to
maintain secrecy, as it is to make the Government abide by the
statutory and constitutional mandates in its attempt to prose-
cute the taxpayer. The government agent, especially lower eche-
19. I.R.C. § 7602.
20. Simplot Co. v. United States, 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. § 9144 (9th Cir. 1976), as
amended by 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. § 9511 (9th Cir. 1977). (The opinion reported
above was withdrawn by an unreported Order under rules of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals on June 28, 1977.)
Ion personnel, seeking to obtain the records may not understand
the significance of a trade secret or the importance of a particu-
lar accounting method. The agent may be involved in an indus-
try audit and may by accident (or otherwise) divulge to a
competitor the successful system of a previously audited
company. The effect on employees when an agent begins an
audit can only be understood by one that has been under audit.
The time and expense required to satisfy the inquisitive agent
may far outweigh any possible revenue that the agent may final-
ly assess. It may be as important to restrict the agent's access to
the taxpayer's books and records in a civil case as in a criminal
case since the civil investigation can easily turn into a criminal
case. Moreover, the agent's aggressiveness may be extremely
destructive to the business of the taxpayer.
The following discussion examines the tools used by the Gov-
ernment in obtaining the books and records of the taxpayer and
books and records maintained for the benefit of the taxpayer by
third parties; and the defenses that may be asserted by the
taxpayer to prevent the acquisition of such books and records
by the revenue agent, the special agent 21 or other agent of the
Internal Revenue Service.
A. The Summons
The statutory authority for the Secretary or the Secretary's
delegate in obtaining books and records of the taxpayer or
books and records maintained on behalf of the taxpayer by
third parties is Section 7602. It provides:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making
a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any
person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity
of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal
revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his dele-
gate is authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which
may be relevant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the
act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having
possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries
relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to
perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may
deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time
and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers,
21. A revenue agent is involved in civil investigation or joint criminal inves-
tigation under the guidance of the special agent. A special agent is assigned to
Intelligence, Internal Revenue Service, and is used to investigate criminal tax
fraud cases. For further discussion on the role of a revenue and special agent
respectively, see REDMAN & QUIGGLE, PROCEDURE BEFORE THE INTERNAL REVE-
NUE SERVICE, 80, 158 (1974 American Law Institute).
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records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may
be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as
may be relevant or material to such inquiry.
Procedurally, the summons must be delivered to the person to
whom it is directed or to the person's last and usual place of
abode.22 The time and place of the examination of the books and
records of the taxpayer or third party must be reasonable, and
the date for the examination shall not be less than ten days from
the date of the summons.23
If the taxpayer or third party recordholder refuses to obey the
summons, United States v. Powell24 requires the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue Service (herein "the Commissioner") to
seek enforcement through an adversary hearing.2 5 In order to
obtain enforcement of the summons, "the Commissioner need
not meet any standard of probable cause .... ,,26 However, the
Commissioner must show that:
(1) The Investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate
purpose
(2) .. .the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose
(3) . . .the information sought is not already within the Commis-
sioner's possession, and
(4) . . .that the administrative steps required by the Code [Internal
Revenue Code of 1954] have been followed .... 27
In Powell, the Court recognized that its inquiry might go
further even if the four requirements stated above were shown
by the Commissioner to be satisfied. For example, if the
Commissioner knew that the cost to the taxpayer of producing
the records required by the summons vastly exceeded the value
of the records to the Commissioner or if the inconvenience to
the taxpayer outweighed any benefit to the Commissioner, the
22. I.R.C. § 7603. Service of the Summons may be accomplished by delivery
to the taxpayer personally, to taxpayer's usual place of abode, or to taxpayer's
last known address unless it is a "John Doe" summons.
23. I.R.C. § 7605(a).
24. 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964).
25. Id. at 58.
26. Id. at 57.
27. Id. at 57, 58. The court does state that the Commissioner must show the
requirements [1] through [4]. However, as a practical matter, the "burden" is on
the taxpayer or recordkeeper to assert the reason the summons should not be
enforced since the Commissioner merely asserts that the material is necessary
to determine whether certain taxes are due.
court could determine (and should determine) that the "sum-
mons had been issued for an improper purpose. 2 8 Any purpose
"reflecting on the good faith of the particular investigation"
could result in the court refusing to enforce the summons if the
enforcement would cause the court's "process to be abused. '29
Nevertheless, the comforting words to the taxpayer and counsel
may be illusory since "[t]he burden of showing an abuse of the
court's process is on the taxpayer."30 Since an enforcement pro-
ceeding is usually at the initial stage of a criminal investigation,
as it appeared to be in Powell, it is unusual that counsel will
fully understand the true purpose behind the issuance of the
summons. Both revenue agents and special agents feel free to
ask questions of counsel or of the taxpayer and obtain evidence
that may be incriminating. However, neither are generally will-
ing to discuss the underlying reasons why the Commissioner or
his delegate is seeking enforcement. It is quite obvious that no
agent is going to confess that the reason for the summons is to
harrass the taxpayer or that it is issued in bad faith. Thus,
because of the difficulty of proving Governmental harrassment
or bad faith at the early stages of a tax investigation, the taxpay-
er is generally forced to disprove that the Commissioner has
complied with the four requirements of Powell.
1. The Summons Enforcement Requirements of Powell.
(A) The Investigation Will Be Conducted Pursuant to a Legiti-
mate Purpose and In Good Faith.
Prior to Powell, the Supreme Court recognized in Reisman v.
Caplin31 that "the witness may challenge the summons on any
appropriate ground ... [including] the defense that the mate-
rial is sought for the improper purpose of obtaining evidence
for use in a criminal prosecution ... ",32 Though Powell gave lip
service to Reisman, it did not appear to provide objective stan-
dards for courts to determine when evidence was being sought
for such improper purpose or if enforcement of a summons
would be granted if an improper purpose was coupled with a
proper purpose.
The only discussion in Powell about the obtaining of evidence
as to criminal fraud was in connection with its discussion as to
whether probable cause of such fraud had to be shown by the
28. Id. at 58.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
32. Id. at 449; cf. Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 772-73 (9th Cir. 1957).
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Commissioner prior to a second investigation. The taxpayer
argued that probable cause for a summons was required be-
cause of Section 7605(b) which prevented a second examination
of a taxpayer's books and records except under certain circum-
stances and where necessary.3 3 The Court stated that "we do not
equate necessity as contemplated by Section 7605(b) with prob-
able cause or any like notion. . ...,34 It continued:
If, in order to determine the existence or nonexistence of fraud in the
taxpayer's returns, information in the taxpayer's records is needed
which is not already in the Commissioner's possession, we think the
examination is not 'unnecessary' within the meaning of Sec. 7605(b).35
Surprisingly, this language, which appears to allow the
Commissioner unrestricted access to records in fraud cases by
means of a summons, has not been cited by later courts who
have attempted to expand the summons powers of the Internal
Revenue Service. The reason may be that the statement was
made in response to the Court's inquiry as to whether probable
cause was required and was not directed to the issue of whether
the summons was being used to obtain criminal evidence. It
may also be that the courts missed the impact of the language or
realized that it could limit the summons power of the Commis-
sioner if a different interpretation was given to the language.
This alternative interpretation, more consistent with Reisman,
which was subsequently cited with approval by Powell, would
be that the Commissioner could obtain only that minimal
amount of "information" necessary to determine whether there
is the existence or nonexistence of fraud. The Commissioner
could not use the summons to obtain evidence in quantity or
quality sufficient to perfect its criminal case. The courts in an
enforcement proceeding could easily determine what informa-
tion was in possession of the Internal Revenue Service and
whether the information sought was needed to make that initial
determination.
36
Notwithstanding the limitation on the Commissioner set forth
in Powell and Reisman, the lower courts began to limit the
33. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 52 (1964).
34. Id. at 53.
35. Id.
36. The distinction as to quantity and quality of evidence in a criminal case
versus a civil case is set forth in AUDIT TECHNIQUE HANDBOOK FOR INTERNAL
REVENUE AGENTS, contained in I CCH, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL-AUDIT, § 4231
(Dec. 11, 1977).
taxpayer's criminal purpose defense. In Wild v. United States37
the court stated that unless the "sole objective" of the investiga-
tion is to obtain evidence for use in criminal prosecution, the
summons will be enforced.38 Since the policy of the Internal
Revenue Service is to suspend any civil proceedings until the
criminal investigation has been completed, the Internal Reve-
nue Service can always argue that the information will be
needed in the subsequent civil proceedings. Enforcement was
ordered in Wild even though a special agent sought the informa-
tion as part of a criminal investigation.39
In 1971, the Supreme Court again considered the Internal
Revenue summons and defenses to its enforcement. 0 The tax-
payer in Donaldson v. United States41 had initially obtained a
preliminary injunction enjoining third parties from turning
over their records to the Commissioner. However, after a full
hearing, the third parties were ordered to appear before the
special agent who issued the summons and produce the re-
quired books and records. On appeal the Supreme Court first
concluded that a taxpayer could not intervene as a matter of
right in an enforcement proceeding against a third party whose
records affect the tax liability of the taxpayer.42 Although un-
necessary for its decision, the Supreme Court then considered
Donaldson's second argument that the "internal revenue sum-
mons may not be utilized at all in aid of an investigation that has
the potentiality of resulting in a recommendation that a crimi-
nal prosecution be instituted against the taxpayer. ' 43 The Court
asserted that it adopted the sole objective rationale of Wild on
the basis that
[t]he Reisman dictum is to be read in light of its citation of Boren, and
of Boren's own citation of O'Connor; when so read, the dictum comes
37. 362 F.2d 206, 208 (9th Cir. 1966). A special agent of the Internal Revenue
Service was conducting an investigation of the tax affairs of Albert J. Wild.
Pursuant to the investigation, the special agent issued a summons directed to
Wild's bank. The summons directed the bank to produce, for examination,
various financial records pertaining to transactions between the bank and Wild.
Wild obtained a preliminary injunction, restraining the bank from complying
with the summons. Proceedings were commenced by the Government to en-
force the summons; Wild intervened; a hearing was held; and an order was
entered granting the special agent's petition for enforcement. Wild thereafter
appealed the order to the Ninth Circuit.
38. There may be other defenses to the summons enforcement as set forth
in Powell, supra note 33.
39. Wild v. United States, 362 F.2d 206, 208 (9th Cir. 1966).
40. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
41. Id. at 522,523. An initial Fourth Amendment challenge was conceded on
oral argument by the taxpayer not to be valid since the summons was directed to
third parties.
42. Id. at 530.
43. Id. at 532.
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into proper focus as applicable to the situation of a pending criminal
charge, or, at most, of an investigation solely for criminal purposes.
Any other holding, of course, would thwart and defeat the appropriate
investigator's powers that the Congress has placed in the Secretary or
his delegate."
Contrary to the statement of Justice Blackmun for the majority
in Donaldson, the Boren Court did not hold that a summons
would be enforced unless the sole object of the investigation
was for criminal purposes or only in those cases where the
taxpayer was under indictment. The Boren Court recognized
realistically that in many cases some preliminary conclusions
would have to be reached by the "Secretary or his delegate"
upon which a conclusion might be drawn that "there existed
facts sufficient upon which to base a possible criminal prosecu-
tion. '45 These preliminary conclusions would not in themselves
prevent the enforcement of a summons otherwise properly is-
sued. Further, the "sole object" test enunciated in Wild was not
required in United States v. O'Connor46 to prevent enforcement
of the summons. Justice Blackmun apparently did not read the
entire 'analysis by Judge Wyzanski in O'Connor since Judge
Wyzanski stated that the subpoena power could not be used "to
uncover information which might aid in the enforcement of
"947criminal statutes and the preparation of criminal cases ... ,
His limitation of the Internal Revenue Service's subpoena pow-
er was not applicable only to post indictment cases. He stated:
The Constitution of the United States, the statutes, the traditions of
our law, the deep rooted preferences of our people speak clearly. They
recognize the primary and nearly exclusive role of the Grand Jury as
the agency of compulsory disclosure. That is the inquisitorial body
provided by our fundamental law to subpoena documents required in
advance of a criminal trial, and in the preparation of an indictment
or its particularization. See Hale v. Henkel. (citation)
To encourage the use of administrative subpoenas as a device for
compulsory disclosure of testimony to be used in presentments of
criminal cases would diminish one of the fundamental guarantees of
liberty. Moreover, it would sanction perversion' of a statutory power.
The power under Sec. 3614 [Sec. 7602] was granted for one purpose,
and is now sought to be used in a direction entirely uncontemplated by
the lawgivers. The limitations implicit in every grant of power are that
it will be used not colorably, but conscientiously for the realization of
those specific ends contemplated by the donors of the power.48
44. Id. at 533.
45. Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 1957).
46. 118 F. Supp. 248, 250 (D.C. Mass. 1953).
47. Id,
48. Id. (emphasis added). In Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1905), the
The subpoena (summons) could not be used if it was issued to
gather evidence for criminal purposes rather than to discover
information and determine if there was sufficient cause to be-
lieve tax evasion may have occurred. The Supreme Court in
Donaldson does soften the Wild test by its unnecessary finding
that it was only a possibility that Donaldson might be indicted
and prosecutel "no more and no less in his case than in the case
of any other taxpayer whose income tax return is undergoing
audit.' ' 49 By implication, if the taxpayer has a greater chance of
prosecution at the time of the issuance of the summons, the
defense might be available. This would be consistent with Bo-
ren and O'Connor. Further, if it is the taxpayer that is being
summoned, Fourth Amendment considerations may preclude
the enforcement proceedings. However, the Court is inconsis-
tent by stating: "the fact that a full scale tax fraud investigation
is being made does not necessarily mean that prosecution en-
sues when tax liability becomes apparent. 5 ° Even if a special
agent is concerned with the "conduct of tax fraud investiga-
tion(s)," such agent's issuance of a summons is valid, the Court
reasoned, since "the special agent may well conduct his investi-
gation jointly with an agent from the Audit Division."'1 The
Court appears to be unaware that the revenue agent assigned to
the case is often necessary to explain the technical nature of
various transactions and is possibly the individual that has un-
covered potential evidence of fraud resulting in referral to the
Intelligence Division. As stated previously, the civil case does
not proceed and the purpose of the new investigation is to sup-
port a criminal prosecution. The special agent's investigation is
always solely for criminal purposes even though a special agent
may assist a revenue agent in a civil case. The special agent has
control over the revenue agent and the manner in which the
case is to be prepared. 52 Justice Blackman's statement for the
majority that prosecution may not ensue even after full investi-
gation is irrelevant since many cases that could be prosecuted
are not because of the amounts involved, the health of the tax-
payer, the number of cases in the office, or other factors uncon-
nected with whether the evidence is sufficient to prove the ele-
ments of a crime.53
Supreme Court stated that "Among an individual's rights are a refusal to in-
criminate himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a war-
rant of the law."
49. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. at 534.
50. Id. at 535.
51. Id. at 534, 538.
52. I CCH, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL-AUDIT § 4231, (10) 95, 2(3) (Aug. 9,
1977).
53. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. at 535.
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Finally, the "holding" of the Court appears to create a differ-
ent test:
We hold that under Sec. 7602, an internal revenue summons may be
issued in aid of an investigation if it is issued in good faith and prior to
a recommendation for criminal prosecution.
54
The "good faith" requirement of Powell is given lip service, but
it is negated by the holding itself. Obviously, the special agent
will withhold a recommendation for prosecution until after the
agent has obtained all of the evidence necessary for criminal
prosecution. Since the taxpayer must prove lack of good faith, it
is seemingly an impossible burden.
Though a proper analysis of O'Connor and Boren would have
supported a literal application of the Reisman-Powell language
prohibiting enforcement if the Internal Revenue Service was
seeking evidence leading to criminal prosecution, Donaldson
attempted to limit Reisman-Powell to bad faith, post referral or
post indictment cases.
Since Donaldson, several courts have enforced a summons
even where the focus of the Internal Revenue Service inquiry
had changed from civil to criminal. Some courts have gone
beyond Donaldson and have allowed enforcement of the sum-
mons even though the taxpayer had moved into a position
where it was very likely that he would be prosecuted. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Billingsley55 a special agent had recom-
mended that the taxpayer be criminally prosecuted. A reading
of Donaldson clearly supported the lower court's decision in
favor of the taxpayer. 56 The appellate court held that "the rec-
ommendation referred to in Donaldson occurs at the earliest,
when the Internal Revenue Service forwards a case to the De-
partment of Justice for criminal prosecution. '57 The court
rationalized that "the potential for civil liability necessarily ac-
companied the potential for criminal prosecution. '5 8 However,
this statement is true even after criminal prosecution since a
54. Id. at 536. This is technically not part of the holding since the issue did
not have to be decided by the Court.
55. 469 F.2d 1208 (10th Cir. 1972). See also United States v. Weingarden, 473
F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 474 F.2d 1234 (6th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Cronen, 483 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1973).
56. United States v. Billingsley, 331 F. Supp. 1091 (N.D. Okla. 1971).
57. United States v. Billingsley, 469 F.2d 1208, 1209 (10th Cir. 1972).
58. Id.
successful prosecution is conclusive of civil fraud. 59 The civil
and criminal aspects are always intermingled but become disen-
gaged for investigation purposes earlier than at the time of
referral to the Department of Justice. In fact, the Intelligence
Division will not even discuss the civil aspects of the case. The
recommendation by the special agent did not and does not
concern itself with any civil aspect. The court's misunderstand-
ing of the procedure in a tax fraud case is clear when it states:
"That [taxpayer] might be indicted and prosecuted remained a
mere possibility. '60 Contrary to the court's conclusion, the
chances of prosecution after the initial review and referral to
the special agent are substantial.61
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Zack,62 believed that
the case law supported summons enforcement "even if the pri-
mary purpose of the investigation is criminal... if there is also
the legitimate purpose of establishing civil tax liability. '63 In an
apparent realization of the control that the Government has
over recommendations and indictments, the court refused to
accept the argument of the Government that indictment or a
recommendation of criminal prosecution is a prerequisite to a
finding that an investigation is solely criminal. It stated that the
Donaldson case set up two requirements rather than one as
advocated by the Government; i.e., the summons must be issued
prior to a recommendation, and it must be used in good faith.
Thus, in this case, if the administrative summons was used solely for
criminal purposes, it is not issued in good faith and is impermissible.
This is true even though there has been no recommendation for prose-
cution.6 '
59. Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1964).
60. United States v. Billingsley, 469 F.2d at 1210.
61. In 1974, the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service
completed 7215 fraud cases and recommended prosecution in 2454 of the cases.
Completions included cases where the initial screening resulted in a return of
the case for civil proceedings. Regional counsel, the next step in the process,
historically has declined prosecutions in approximately 30% of the cases. Once it
reaches the last step, the Department of Justice, the declination rate is minimal
(91 cases in 1974). Therefore, even assuming that all 7215 cases in 1974 were
investigated by special agents rather than declined prior to referral during the
initial screening, the investigated taxpayer has approximately a 20% chance of
indictment and prosecution, certainly more than a mere possibility. With respect
to the chances of any taxpayer who is undergoing audit to be indicted, the
chances are less than 1/2000 that such taxpayer will be indicted and prosecuted.
1975 Annual Report of Internal Service (computations are those of the author.)
See CROWLEY & MANNING, supra note 2 at 5259.
62. 521 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1975).
63. Id. at 1368. The Court argues that its apparent inconsistent decision in
United States v. Bell, 448 F.2d 40, 42 (9th Cir. 1971) is "not to the contrary" since
one object of the investigation was to determine civil liability. Id. at n. 1.
64. Id. at 1368.
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Though the lower court found that the investigation was solely
for criminal purposes, the case was reversed and remanded
because of the court's inability to determine if the trier of fact
had used the correct test (whatever it might be!).65
A recent decision extends Zack by suggesting that some
courts may find "bad faith" when the special agent holds back
the recommendation or has sufficient information to conclude
that a recommendation for prosecution will be made. In United
States v. Lafko, 66 as in Zack, the court recognized that Donald-
son set up two tests in its holding.67 It cited with approval
United States v. Wall Corp.68 which determined after Donald-
son that "a firm purpose to recommend criminal prosecution"
was all that was needed and "if the civil liability were already
determined, the summons would appear to be solely for a crimi-
nal purpose." 69 The court reiterated the dicta in Reisman to the
effect that the "Internal Revenue has no authority to conduct a
criminal investigation through the use of its summons power. '70
Unlike earlier cases, the court refused to accept the view that
Donaldson prevented further inquiry by a court if there were
both a civil and criminal proceeding. In United States v. Fried-
man71 the court was asked to adopt "a per se rule that the
issuance of a Sec. 7602 summons by a special agent having
power to recommend prosecution is always improper. '72
Though it refused to adopt such a rule, it did review post
Donaldson cases in its (Third Circuit) effort to provide lower
courts with meaningful guidelines in summons enforcement
cases.
These cases recognize that the IRS has no authority to conduct a
criminal investigation through the use of a Sec. 7602 civil summons.
But if (1) the Intelligence Division of the IRS has not yet recommended
prosecution, (2) the investigating agent has not already formed a firm
purpose to recommend prosecution, (3) the summons is not being used
to harass the taxpayer and (4) the material referred to in the summons
has not already been inspected by the government, these cases hold
that the mere fact that criminal as well as civil liability may result will
not prevent judicial enforcement.73
65. Id. at 1369.
66. 520 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1975).
67. Id. at 625.
68. 475 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
69. Id. at 895.
70. 520 F.2d at 624.
71. 532 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1976).
72. Id. at 932, 933.
73. Id. at 932. One of the cases cited, United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d
In United States v. Asphalt Materials, Inc. ,"4 a case in which a
petition for certiorari has been filed with the Supreme Court,
the lower court ordered that the defendants comply with the
Internal Revenue Service summons.75 In its analysis, the court
did suggest a test somewhat different than Friedman:
The likelihood of a criminal prosecution does not bar enforcement of
a Section 7602 summons so long as a good faith civil investigation of
the taxpayer is being conducted." [Emphasis added]
If the test cannot be determined by an objective standard, i.e., if
the court cannot determine by objective proof whether a good
faith civil investigation of the taxpayer is being conducted, it is
as useless in obtaining uniformity in enforcement proceedings
as the tests in both Donaldson and other post Donaldson cases
have proven to be. However, the court can determine if a civil
investigation is being conducted by understanding the proce-
dures of the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice and determining what phase the investigation has prog-
ressed. If a revenue agent has discovered information which
suggests the possibility of fraud, the agent prepares a referral
report for the Intelligence Division which sets forth the reasons
why fraud is suspected. It is initially screened by the Chief of
the Intelligence Division. According to the Audit Technique
Handbook for Internal Revenue Agents 77 the case is retained by
Intelligence "if it appears that sufficient evidence can be
gathered to prove willful violation beyond a reasonable doubt
as required in a criminal case. 7 8 Obviously, the inquiry has
gone past that indicated in Donaldson, even prior to the assign-
ment of the case by the Chief to a special agent, since the tax-
payer has a greater chance of prosecution than any other tax-
payer. The special agent, once assigned, is required to gather
the evidence to prove willful violation beyond a reasonable
doubt. As stated previously, the civil investigation is suspended
either formally or informally so that Intelligence may control
the method of investigation, impose safeguards to protect the
information gathered, and ensure that the revenue agent does
not cause the suppression of evidence by violating the constitu-
368 (3d Cir. 1975), provides a suggested procedural guide for both the Govern-
ment and the taxpayer to use in enforcement proceedings.
74. 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. § 9143 (W.D.N.Y. 1976); aff'd 1977-2 U.S. Tax Cas. §
9449 (2d Cir. 1977).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. I CCH, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE MANUAL-AUDIT § 4231, (10) 93 (May
27, 1977).
78. Id. at (10) 93. However, the manual does not explain the method or
methods of gathering the evidence.
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tional rights of the taxpayer.
79
Therefore, the court's inquiry could be limited to decide
whether or not the "initial screening" resulted in a retention of
the case or a return of the case for civil proceedings. If it were
retained, the summons should not be enforced since evidence
gathering is for criminal prosecution and is unrelated at that
time to the civil investigation which is either suspended or left
open until completion of the criminal investigation. This proce-
dure would appear to balance the interests of society since the
taxpayer would be protected from turning over books and
records to a lower echelon official in contravention of the tax-
payer's constitutional and statutory rights, and the Government
could still seek a court supervised search warrant if its investi-
gation disclosed criminal activity and probable cause. 80
This test in modified form was applied in an earlier case,
United States v. LaSalle National Bank.81 Though the court
stated that "the presence of a special agent assigned to the
investigation does not automatically make it a criminal investi-
gation,"82 its enforcement powers would be used only if the
focus of the investigation is not upon criminal prosecution; i.e.,
the criminal prosecution is the end and goal of the Internal
Revenue Service's investigation.
(B) The Taxpayer Shall Not Be Subjected To Unnecessary
Examinations.
Section 7605(b) provides:
No taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary examination or investi-
gations, and only one inspection of a taxpayer's books of account shall
be made for each taxable year unless the taxpayer requests otherwise
or unless the Secretary or his delegate, after investigation, notifies the
taxpayer in writing that an additional inspection is necessary.
79. In United States v. Gilpin, 542 F.2d 38, 40 (7th Cir. 1976) the court stated:
"In this regard, it is established procedure that when, during his investigation, a
Revenue Agent discovers an indication of fraud, he is required to cease his
examination and refer the case to the Intelligence Division, Internal Revenue
Service Manual, Part IV, Section 4565.2."
80. Contra, United States v. Doney, 559 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1977).
81. 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. § 9407 (N. Ill. 1976).
82. Id. Even under the test advocated, if a special agent is contacted merely
for information by a revenue agent (i.e., what to look for to ascertain whether
fraud is present), such involvement by a special agent would not preclude
enforcement.
This statutory rule has been likened to the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against illegal searches and seizures and may be
asserted by the taxpayer in summons enforcement proceedings
even if the focus of the inquiry is civil. Further, the taxpayer can
move to suppress evidence obtained by the Internal Revenue
Service in contravention of the statute.
In Application of Leonardo,83 the taxpayers had been previ-
ously audited by the Internal Revenue Service and deficiencies
had been assessed and paid. Without a request in writing as
required by Section 7605(b), an agent returned for an inspection
of the books and records of the taxpayers for the same years.
However, the agent misled the bookkeeper of the taxpayers by
informing the bookkeeper that he was examining subsequent
tax years.8 4 The court first determined that there was no consent
to the inspection since the bookkeeper was misled. It then con-
sidered the question of whether the court can grant relief to the
taxpayers for abuse of the statutory process. It concluded:
Courts have inherent disciplinary power over any officer thereof,
including the United States Attorney, to protect persons whose prop-
erty is unlawfully in the possession of such court officer, and the
granting of such protection does not depend upon the presence or
absence of any especial kind of illegality.
By analogy to a pre-indictment motion under Rule 41(e) to suppress
the evidentiary use in a federal criminal trial of material allegedly
procured through an unreasonable search and seizure, the propriety
of which is no longer open to question [citations], this Court may
afford similar relief to prevent the use of evidence in violation of a
federal statute, which like Section 7605(b), relates to the taxpayer's
privacy.8
5
Evidence may be suppressed even if notice has been given by
the Secretary or his delegate if the court determines that the
examination is unnecessary.86 The necessity of a second exami-
nation, whether as part of a criminal investigation or civil inves-
tigation, must be shown by the Government who "has the bur-
den of showing the materiality and relevance of the proposed
examination to the tax liability [citations]. ' 87 Further, even if
the Government has met its burden of proof, the taxpayer may
show that the examination is unnecessary because the informa-
tion sought is already in the possession of the Government.8
83. 208 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1962). A special agent was involved at one
time in the investigation.
84. Id. at 126.
85. Id. at 127.
86. See U.S. Aluminum Siding Corp. v. Eshleman, 170 F. Supp. 12, 14 (N.D.
Ill. 1958).
87. Id. at 14, 15; United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. at 56.
88. United States v. Pritchard, 428 F.2d 969, 971 (5th Cir. 1971).
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However, this defense is not available to the taxpayer if the
books and records sought are third party's books and records.
8 9
Notwithstanding Leonardo, the effectiveness of the defense is
diminished by the willingness of courts to find that the Internal
Revenue Service has been involved in a continual examination
and that a second examination has not been initiated, so that no
notification is necessary. This result has been reached even
after books and records have been reviewed by the Internal
Revenue Service and a proposed settlement discussed and
agreed to by the taxpayer and revenue agent.90
(C) Relevancy, Possession of Information by Commissioner,
and Compliance With Administrative Steps.
Though it is the purpose of this Article to focus on the bad
faith criminal prosecution defense to summons enforcement,
the other Powell requirements are oftentimes intertwined. Ob-
viously, the good faith of the Commissioner and the relevancy
of the inquiry may be questioned if the papers sought are in the
Commissioner's possession.91
The failure to comply with administrative procedures that
must be followed to issue a summons as set forth in Sections
7602, 7603, 7605 and 7609 may also affect the court's decision on
the good faith of the Commissioner.
If a third party has received the summons, the taxpayer or
third party may have to rely on these procedural requirements
since the Fourth and Fifth Amendment, which are personal to
the taxpayer, cannot generally be asserted. For the same rea-
son, Section 7605(b) cannot be asserted. Because of the obvious
financial and time consuming burden placed on a third party
and the inability of the taxpayer to raise certain defenses, the
courts will tolerate less of a "fishing expedition" if the summons
is directed to a third party. More stringent rules of relevancy
and materiality will be applied.2 The court will consider "policy
89. United States v. Bank of Commerce, 405 F.2d 931, 933 (3d Cir. 1969).
90. United States v. Williams, 381 F. Supp. 492 (S.D. Ala. 1974). It is un-
known why the taxpayer did not assert that the information was already in the
possession of the Internal Revenue Service. See United States v. Gilpin, 542
F.2d 38, 40 (7th Cir. 1976).
91. United States v. London Ins. Agency, Inc., 76-2 U.S. Tax Cas. § 9735 (D.
R.I. 1976).
92. United States v. Luther, 481 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1973). In light of the new
and burdensomeness" and whether the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice has in its possession the records being sought even if the
records are in a different form in the hands of the third party. 3
Though the Government is not required to "state with preci-
sion what light [the records subpoenaed] may shed upon the
taxpayer's correct income tax liability," it has the "burden of
demonstrating some justifiable expectation that the informa-
tion sought [from the third party] is relevant to the purpose of
the inquiry. '9 4 The information sought must be more than mar-
ginally relevant, and the Government must prove more than "a
general need for a 'road map' to guide it, through the assist-
ance of a third party, to information that may assist the Govern-
ment in discovering errors or omissions as to income tax lia-
bility.9 5
Recently, in United States v. Bisceglia,96 the Supreme Court
expanded the right of the Internal Revenue Service to obtain
information from third parties even where it failed to identify
the taxpayer in the summons. However, it recognized the obliga-
tion of the courts to scrutinize carefully the summons "to deter-
mine whether [the Internal Revenue Service] seeks information
relevant to a legitimate investigative purpose. '' 97
2. The Summons and The Tax Reform Act of 1976.
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the taxpayer had to rely
upon luck and extraordinary court relief to prevent a third
party from disclosing records to the Internal Revenue Service.
Since the Service did not have to disclose the fact that it was
seeking records, the taxpayer had to generally rely upon a dis-
closure by the third party that it had received a summons. If the
taxpayer could not persuade the third party recordkeeper to
refuse to comply with the summons, the taxpayer was forced to
seek an injunction to enjoin the third party from voluntarily
rules and reimbursement policy of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the court may be
less concerned with applying a different standard. However, any requirement is
still burdensome.
93. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942,948,950 (D. Colo.
1974). The court did state that it could not conclude on that basis alone that the
Government was "limited to summoning information which the Service has not
already reveiwed in another form ... " However, it is a factor in balancing the
interests of the parties. Id. at 950. The court reviewed in its decision many cases
dealing with the question of relevancy.
94. Id. at 962.
95. Id. at 953 citing United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1968)
and United States v. Williams, 337 F. Supp. 1114 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), appeal vacated
and dismissed, 489 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1971).
96. 420 U.S. 141 (1975).
97. Id. at 146.
424
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complying. If an enforcement proceeding was instituted be-
cause the third party refused voluntary compliance, the taxpay-
er was forced to attempt to intervene, sometimes successfully
but oftentimes unsuccessfully. Sections 7609 and 7610 of the
Internal Revenue Code were added by the Tax Reform Act of
1976 to provide a statutory procedure for the taxpayer to stay
compliance and to intervene.
Section 7609 requires notice of the summons directed to a
"third party recordkeeper" to be given to any person who is
"identified in the description of the records contained in the
summons." In order to prevent the record keeper from comply-
ing with the summons, such noticed person must give the
recordkeeper notice in writing not to comply, which notice must
be copied and sent by registered or certified mail to the Internal
Revenue Service office as the Secretary may direct in the origi-
nal notice. A "third party recordkeeper includes an attorney,
accountant, Savings and Loan, bank, consumer reporting agen-
cy, person extending credit and through credit cards or similar
devices, or any broker .... ,,98 Failure to strictly comply with
the notice requirements will prevent the taxpayer from staying
compliance or intervening.99 Notice to the taxpayer is not re-
quired if the court, upon petition by the Secretary, determines
that
there is reasonable cause to believe the giving of notice may lead to
attempts to conceal, destroy, alter records relevant to the examina-
tion, to prevent the communication of information from other persons
through intimidation, bribery, or collusion, or to flee to avoid prosecu-
tion, testifying, or production of records.1°0
Section 7609 also deals with the "John Doe Summons" in an
attempt to reduce the potential for abuse by the Internal Reve-
nue Service and to provide safeguards not required by the statu-
tory scheme as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Bisceglia.
98. Broker is defined in Section 3(a)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1954, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1971). If a taxpayer is providing information for any
type of business transaction, or a third party is preparing information in the
taxpayer's behalf and certain information is provided by the taxpayer, the
taxpayer would be well advised to turn over the records to one of the delineated
"third party recordkeepers" who should retain the information and services of
the non-qualifying third party.
99. Elcan v. Internal Revenue Service, 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9630 (M.D. Tenn.
1977).
100. I.R.C. § 7609(g).
John Doe Summons have received widespread attention in
newspapers, Congress and in other articles and notes.' °0
B. The Fifth Amendment. Protection of the Taxpayer-Illus-
ory or Real?
According to one of the leading commentators in the tax
fraud field, the Fifth Amendment no longer protects the written
testimony of the taxpayer. 02 His startling statement was based
in large part on the holding in Andresen v. Maryland,10 3 decided
by the Supreme Court in 1976. Andresen was a culmination of
several years of major retreat by the Supreme Court from Boyd
v. United States'°4 which set forth the availability of the Fifth
Amendment to prevent the Government from extorting a man's
private papers. 05
The first major limitation specifically affecting the right of a
taxpayer to assert the protection appeared in 1973 in Couch v.
United States.10 6 In Couch, the question before the Supreme
Court was whether a taxpayer could assert her privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination to prevent the Internal Revenue
Service from compelling her accountant from turning over the
taxpayer's business and tax records which were in the account-
ant's possession. 10 7
In denying the taxpayer the right to assert the defense, the
Court limited the defense to those situations where both own-
ership and possession are present. The Court stated "[i]t is ex-
tortion of information from the accused himself that offends
our sense of justice."'0 8 Where "the ingredient of personal
compulsion against the accused is lacking," the Fifth Amend-
ment is unavailable. 0 9
The Court did recognize that "constructive possession" may
be asserted if "the relinquishment of possession is so temporary
and insignificant as to leave the personal compulsion upon the
accused substantially intact." Since there was a continuous in-
101. See, e.g., Note, Taxation: I.R.S. Use of John Doe Administrative Sum-
mons, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 465 (1977). John Doe Summons are used by the I.R.S. to
obtain books and records of an individual where the name of such individual
may be unknown to the service.
102. Statement of H. Balter, May 12-13, 1977, Practicing Law Institute, Lec-
ture, Tax Frauds.
103. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
104. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
105. Id. at 633.
106. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
107. Id. at 323.
108. Id. at 328.
109. Id. at 329.
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terchange of records between the taxpayer and her accountant,
there was more than "fleeting divestment of possession."' 10 In
dismissing the taxpayer's assertion that the Fifth Amendment
protected her from such invasion of privacy, the Court opined
that there could be no expectation of privacy by the taxpayer
since the accountant must make mandatory disclosures to the
taxing authorities of "much of the information."'' The Court
avoids the obvious. Accountants are an integral part of every
major business transaction since unfavorable tax consequences
may be the transaction's deathblow. There are numerous ac-
countants who never see a tax return and are retained for tax
planning. Their working papers may in fact include examples of
tax evasion (how to or how not to) in an effort to properly (or
improperly) guide the taxpayer. If the free exchange of ideas is
hampered by the lack of privacy, the taxpayer will be forced to
forego the guidance of the professional. The destruction of
work papers and other documents will be the norm rather than
the exception.
In the following year, the Supreme Court in Bellis v. United
States" 2 compelled a partner in a dissolved three man partner-
ship to turn over partnership financial statements to a grand
jury. Prior to Bellis, corporations, associations, and large part-
nerships had not been able to assert the Fifth Amendment, 13
but it had been thought that records of a small partnership
would be within the scope of the privilege. The Court distin-
guished Boyd by stating that it applied only to "business
records of the sole proprietor or sole practitioner as well as to
personal documents containing more intimate information
about the individual's private life."' 1' 4 Records of the partner-
ship could not be immune since there could be no expectation of
privacy.115
The unanswered question as to whether the Fifth Amendment
110. Id. at 333, 334 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 335.
112. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
113. The Fifth Amendment is not available to corporations, Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); associations, United States v. White, 226 U.S. 478
(1913); or large partnerships, In re Mal Brothers Contracting Co., 444 F.2d 615
(3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971).
114. 417 U.S. at 87, 88.
115. Id. at 91, 92.
could be asserted by a taxpayer if his attorney was in possession
of the books and records was answered in 1976 in Fisher v.
United States.116 The taxpayers were interviewed apparently
by a special agent in connection with an investigation of possi-
ble civil or criminal liability. Shortly thereafter, the taxpayers
obtained certain records from their accountant and turned
them over to their attorneys, Fisher and Kasmir. Both attorneys
were retained by the taxpayers to assist them in the investiga-
tion. Upon discovering that the accountant's records, work pa-
pers, reports and copies of tax returns were delivered to the
attorneys, the Internal Revenue Service issued a summons to
Messrs. Fisher and Kasmir."17
The confusion created by Couch was illustrated by the unique
history of the case. Mr. Fisher's enforcement order was affirm-
ed in the Third Circuit and Mr. Kasmir's enforcement order was
reversed by the Fifth Circuit." 8 The Supreme Court agreed with
the conclusion of the Fifth Circuit that "if the Fifth Amendment
would have excused a taxpayer from turning over the account-
ant's papers had he possessed them, the attorney to whom they
are delivered for the purpose of obtaining legal advice should
also be immune from subpoena." 1 9 The Court's agreement was
based on the attorney-client privilege of the Fifth Amendment.
In order to prevent the production of the requested documents,
the taxpayer or his attorney would have to assert the attorney-
client privilege.120 The Fifth Amendment was not available, the
Court reasoned, because the taxpayers are compelled to do no
more than was the taxpayer in Couch.12' "Agent or no, the
lawyer is not the taxpayer. The taxpayer is the 'accused' and
nothing is being extorted from him.'
1 22
Although the taxpayers did not assert the attorney-client
privilege specifically, the Court felt "obliged to inquire whether
the attorney-client privilege applies to documents in the hands
of an attorney which would have been privileged in the hands of
the client by reason of the Fifth Amendment.'1 23 Before the
attorney-client privilege would ripen, the subpoenaed docu-
ments would have to contain disclosures which are confidential
116. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
117. Id. at 394, 395.
118. Id. at 395, 396.
119. Id. at 396.
120. Id. at 402.
121. Id. at 398.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 402.
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in nature, constitute testimonial compulsion, 124 and be neces-
sary for the legal advice sought. 2 ' Further, if the records are
transferred to the attorney for safe keeping and not for advice,
the Court suggests by implication that it would order produc-
tion of the records even though a taxpayer could not be com-
pelled to produce the records had the records been in his posses-
sion.
1 26
Since the records were submitted to the attorneys by the tax-
payers for advice, the Court had to decide whether the records
could have been obtained directly from the taxpayers. Since the
papers did not contain "compelled testimonial evidence" the
Fifth Amendment would not have been available to the taxpay-
ers. There were no tacit averments by the taxpayers as to either
the existence of the papers demanded or as to their ownership
of the papers. 27 "[T]he act of producing them-the only thing
which the taxpayer is compelled to do-would not itself involve
testimonial self-incrimination.' 1 28 The Court specifically re-
fused to decide whether a taxpayer could be compelled to pro-
duce personal tax records in his possession.
The unanswered question appeared to some 129 to be resolved
unfavorably to the taxpayer in Andresen v. Maryland. How-
ever, the specific issue before the Court was succinctly stated in
the first sentence of the Court's opinion: "[t]his case presents the
issue whether the introduction into evidence of a person's busi-
ness records, seized during a search of his offices, violated the
Fifth Amendment's command that '[n]o person . . .shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self."",130
Andresen, an attorney, 13 1 was involved in certain fraudulent
124. Testimonial compulsion requires the defendant to give oral testimony
or produce documents or real evidence. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2263 et. seq.
(1970).
125. 425 U.S. at 402-404.
126. Id. at 405.
127. Id. at 409, 410.
128. Id. at 411. The court doubted whether an implied admission as to the
existence and possession of papers will rise "to the level of testimony within the
protection of the Fifth Amendment." Id.
129. See note 102, supra.
130. 427 U.S. at 465.
131. The petitioner argued his own case which once again illustrates the old
adage.
real estate transactions. During the investigation, the inves-
tigators obtained search warrants which were used to obtain
personal records of the petitioner including his own incriminat-
ing statements which he had voluntarily committed to writing.
Andresen sought unsuccessfully in the lower court to suppress
the evidence.
The Supreme Court refused to overturn the lower court by
answering its own question in the negative since as in Couch
and Fisher, "the petitioner was not asked to say or do any-
thing." '132 Any other conclusion, the Court opined, would under-
mine earlier decisions of the Court. However, the Court does
appear to answer in part the unresolved Fisher issue favorably
to the taxpayer if Fisher is understood to vastly limit the Fifth
Amendment privilege even as to documents in the possession of
the taxpayer. The Court in Andresen recognizes that the "Fifth
Amendment may protect an individual from complying with a
subpoena [summons] for the production of his personal records
in his possession because the very act of production may consti-
tute a compulsory authentication of incriminating informa-
tion .... "133 Although the use of the word "may" in the quoted
sentence precludes an absolute rule that a summons to the tax-
payer for the production of personal records may be quashed,
the Court will deny enforcement if the taxpayer is required to
aid in the discovery, production, or authentication of personal
documents or effects that might incriminate the taxpayer.134
Otherwise, the careful distinctions the Court makes between
Bellis, Fisher and other Fifth Amendment cases would be
meaningless. Nevertheless, the personal documents or effects
must meet the definitional requirements of Fisher, and the tax-
payer's privacy must be invaded to the extent that he is person-
ally compelled to aid the Government.
Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Andresen, illustrates the
fallacy of Justice Blackmun's assertion that the majority opin-
ion is based on historical precedent. To exclude the personal
records of the taxpayer or accused from the zone of privacy
"ignores the essential spirit of the Fifth Amendment.' 135 The
distinction by the Court between a search warrant and sum-
mons is too simplistic since a search and seizure "is as rife with
elements of compulsion as subpoena. The intrusion occurs
under the lawful process of the State. The individual is not free
132. 427 U.S. at 473.
133. Id. at 473, 474.
134. Id. at 474.
135. Id. at 486, 487-492.
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to resist that authority."' 36 The forcible extortion of a man's
papers recognized as prohibited by the Fifth Amendment in
Boyd occurs whether the taxpayer produces the document or
the Government forces its way into the private sanctity of the
taxpayer's house or business.
Regardless of whether the majority decision in Andresen is
historically unsound, it is obviously binding. In order for the
taxpayer to successfully assert the Fifth Amendment, he must
illustrate all of the following:
1. The taxpayer must be an individual;
137
2. The taxpayer must be required by summons or similar legal
process to personally discover, produce, or authenticate his personal
papers; and
3. The personal papers must be confidential in nature and consti-
tute testimonial communication that is incriminating.
If such privileged papers are in the hands of the taxpayer's
attorney, the attorney-client privilege will be available if:
1. The papers have been transferred to the attorney by the tax-
payer;
2. The papers are necessary to the attorney in rendering advice to
the taxpayer which advice is sought; and
3. The disclosures contained within the papers might not have
been made absent the privilege.
If the ruling in Andresen is strictly followed, the attorney may
be forced to obey a search warrant even as to papers of his
client which meet the Fisher criteria for invoking the attorney-
client privilege since there would be no compulsion as to the
client. For example, if the taxpayer took his records out of
hiding, gave information to his attorney in documentary form,
or the attorney prepared notes of his conversations with the
taxpayer, the Government could obtain a search warrant and
assert that the taxpayer as in Couch was not compelled to do
anything. Since the Fifth Amendment would be unavailable to
the taxpayer, the attorney could not assert the attorney-client
privilege if the court's language in Fisher is literally applied.
However, this would destroy the attorney-client privilege as we
know it today and the court may (hopefully) be forced to retreat
from this conclusion. It might be difficult in other areas for the
136. Id. at 486, 487.
137. If a taxpayer partner is not maintaining papers in a representative
capacity, the taxpayer may be entitled to assert the Fifth Amendment.
Government to show probable cause in order to obtain the war-
rant, but oftentimes the Internal Revenue Service is aware of
what is in the hands of the attorney because of the statements of
the attorney in his effort to convince the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice that the case should not be referred for prosecution. The
special agents might seek out a friendly employee or secretary
of either the taxpayer or attorney to support the application for
the warrant. The evidence in the hands of the attorney would
obviously be relevant and would relate to the crime charged.
However, such literal application of the rule would destroy the
very purpose of the attorney-client privilege; i.e., the client must
be able to confide in his lawyer so that the lawyer can fully
advise the client. 138 Hopefully, the pendulum will not swing so
far.
C. The Fourth Amendment-Safeguard of the Taxpayer.
Unlike the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment is avail-
able to a corporate taxpayer, a partner, or an individual.139 It
can be asserted to quash a summons that is unreasonable or
overly burdensome. 140 It is also an important tool in preventing
the Internal Revenue Service from obtaining evidence unlaw-
fully, which will be the focus of this section.
Until the Watergate investigations, the extent of the Internal
Revenue Service's activity in investigations unrelated to reve-
nue gathering was generally unknown. Because of the disclo-
sures during the investigations that the Executive Branch was
using the Internal Revenue Service agents for non-revenue mat-
ters, the courts began to scrutinize more closely the activities of
the agents. This increased concern is due in part to the tremen-
dous power given to lower echelon personnel in the Internal
Revenue Service, power which is not supervised by either
superiors within the Service or the court. An understanding by
taxpayers, their counsel and third party recordkeepers of the
scope of the illegal activities will assist them in preventing
agents from enjoying the fruits of their efforts.
An example of the misuse of power by agents and their at-
tempt to obtain evidence by any means is illustrated in United
States v. Tweel,' 4' decided in 1977. After the completion of an
138. 425 U.S. at 403.
139. See, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920);
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
140. United States v. First National Bank of Fort Smith, 173 F. Supp. 716
(W.D. Ark. 1959).
141. 550 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1977).
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audit to which a special agent had been assigned, but had with-
drawn, a second audit was initiated at the specific request of the
Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Department
of Justice. A revenue agent sought and obtained an appoint-
ment with the taxpayer's accountant. In response to a question
of the accountant, the revenue agent stated that there was no
special agent involved. The agent failed to disclose that the
audit was not a routine audit, causing the accountant to believe
that it was simply a civil audit. In reliance on the representa-
tions of the agent, the accountant "voluntarily" provided the
agent with the taxpayer's records. 142 The court stated that "a
consent search is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment if
the consent was induced by the deceit, trickery or misrepresen-
tation of the Internal Revenue agent. ' 143 It found from the facts
that "the agent's failure to apprise the [taxpayer] of the obvious
criminal nature of this investigation was a sneaky deliberate
deception by the agent... and a flagrant disregard for
[taxpayer's] rights. The silent misrepresentation was both inten-
tionally misleading and material." 144 The Court gave a stern
warning because of the assertion by the Government that the
procedures followed by the agent were "routine". "If that is the
case we hope our message is clear. This sort of deception will
not be tolerated and if this is the 'routine' it should be corrected
immediately. 1 45
Although the Government may use decoys and may conceal
the identity of its agents in certain limited instances, "the vari-
ous protections of the Bill of Rights, of course, provide checks
upon such official deception for the protection of the individu-
als." 1 " A search and seizure obtained by stealth is as unreason-
able as one obtained by force or coercion.1 47 Special agents
cannot avoid disclosing their identity by staying behind the
scene and directing the activity of the revenue agent.148 If the
illegal activity is conducted by one other than a Government
142. Id. at 298.
143. Id. at 299.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 300 n. 9.
146. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 209 (1966).
147. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305 (1921).
148. United States v. Lipshitz, 132 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1955); United States
v. Guerrina, 112 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Penn. 1953).
agent without the knowledge of the Government, the evidence
obtained will not be suppressed even if it is used by the Govern-
ment.
149
D. Other Methods of Governmental Access to Records.
If the Government is unsuccessful in obtaining a search war-
rant or believes it cannot enforce a summons, it may seek infor-
mation through a grand jury investigation. Because of the sub-
stantial investigatory powers of the grand jury, it is extremely
difficult for the taxpayer or his counsel to prevent the gathering
of evidence. Until recently, the Government, as a matter of
course, obtained ex parte orders pursuant to Rule 6(e) 150 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which enabled Internal
Revenue Service agents to obtain secret information from the
grand jury that might be unavailable by other means.
Because of the grand jury's massive power to intrude upon
the taxpayer, the Ninth Circuit recently limited the agent's ac-
cess to the grand jury information. In Simplot Co. v. United
States,'15 the court believed that Rule 6(e) could not be indis-
criminately used to "include agency personnel whenever it suits
the convenience of the United States Attorney .... ,,152 Though
the court was concerned with limiting the use of the grand jury
information in a potential civil proceeding, its analysis of Rule
6(e) suggests a procedure for defense counsel to prevent indis-
criminate agent involvement even in the criminal aspect of the
case. It recognized that "[t]o allow government agencies access
would create a serious inequity in grand jury procedures and
would undercut the function of secrecy as a bulwark against
149. Meister v. Vomm'r, 504 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1974); See also United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
150. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), Secrecy of Proceedings and Disclosure: Disclo-
sure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations and
the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the government for use in
the performance of their duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter, stenog-
rapher, operator of a recording device, or any typist who transcribes recorded
testimony may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so
directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding
or when permitted by the court at the request of the defendant upon a showing
that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of
matters occurring before the grand jury. No obligation of secrecy may be im-
posed upon any person except in accordance with this rule. The court may
direct that an indictment shall be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or
has given bail, and in that event the clerk shall seal the indictment and no person
shall disclose the finding of the indictment except when necessary for the
issuance and execution of a warrant or summons.
151. 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. § 9144 (9th Cir. 1976) as amended by 77-2 Tax Cas. §
9511 (9th Cir. 1977).
152. Id.
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unwarranted investigations. '153 To safeguard the independence
of the grand jury, the court interprets Rule 6(e) as requiring an
adversary hearing to determine if agency access should be al-
lowed. Further, the Government "must show the necessity for
each particular person's aid rather than showing merely a gen-
eral necessity for assistance, expert or otherwise. Moreover
absent an explanation for the failure to use qualified personnel
within the Justice Department the Government cannot carry its
burden of showing that outside personnel are necessary.'
1 54
III. CONCLUSION
Because of the ever increasing expansion of the Govern-
ment's right of access to taxpayer's books and records, the tax-
payer, and third party recordholders, and counsel, must assess
what business information should be recorded, what records
should be retained, and where the records should be kept. Such
decisions must be made in light of the substantial bookkeeping
requirements of the Internal Revenue Code.
In connection with summons enforcement proceedings,
counsel must educate the courts as to the procedure of the
Internal Revenue Service so that courts will recognize that upon
referral of a case to the Intelligence Division of the Internal
Revenue Service, the civil aspects of the case are suspended and
the focus of the investigation becomes criminal. As advocated in
this article, this should be the starting point of the court's in-
quiry as to whether the investigation has ceased to be civil in
nature. If the court finds that the case has been retained by
Intelligence and not returned for civil proceedings, a summons
issued by the Internal Revenue Service contemporaneously or
subsequent to such retention should not be enforced. This result
would not prevent the Internal Revenue Service from obtaining
books and records of the taxpayer. It would merely require
court supervision of any search and reduce the chance for ab-
use by lower echelon officials of the Internal Revenue Service.
If this test is adopted, any detriment to the Government is far
outweighed by the substantial risk of abuse with respect to the
taxpayer which would otherwise occur.
153. Id.
154. Id.
Taxpayers and third party recordholders must also be
educated by their counsel as to the practices of agents so that
illegal activity can be curtailed. Once a special agent is assigned
to a case, the acts of a revenue agent are suspect; or if a civil
investigation appears to be unduly prolonged, the taxpayer
must be instructed that cooperation with the Service is the ex-
ception and not the rule. Before any statements are made, even
if the statements are exculpatory, the taxpayer and his counsel
must fully analyze what the Service is seeking. Every statutory
and constitutional right must be asserted at each administrative
step.
